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Abstract. We present a modeling approach for generating robust predictions about how changes
in institutional, economic, and political considerations will influence the outcome of political nego-
tiations over complex water-ecosystem policy debates. Evaluating the political viability of proposed
policies is challenging for researchers in these complex natural and political environments; there is
limited information with which to map policies to outcomes to utilities or to represent the politi-
cal process adequately. Our analysis evaluates the viability of policy options using a probabilistic
political viability criterion that explicitly recognizes the existence of modeling uncertainty. The
approach is used to conduct a detailed case study of the future of California’s Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta. Several other possible applications of the approach are briefly discussed.
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1. Introduction
Conflicts between water users and ecosystem needs are common around the world. Whether and
how these conflicts are resolved depends on the specific political, institutional and economic cir-
cumstances of a particular problem. In many cases, the precise nature of these circumstances is
difficult to define, so isolating a predicted outcome of a negotiation is challenging. An alternative
approach is to seek to predict outcomes that are very unlikely to emerge as a negotiation outcome
regardless of the precise definitions of all elements of the bargaining environment. In this paper,
we present and illustrate a modeling approach to generating such predictions.
Our approach is designed to address common feature of conflicts regarding water and ecosystem
management. First, we focus on specific, one-time policy negotiations between several distinct
stakeholder groups involving market and non-market valuations, private and public goods, and
tradeoffs between economic and environmental objectives. In this setting, the complexities really
matter: it is important to model the interconnected economic, social, and ecosystem impacts
of the various policy options under consideration. As a result, any model which attempts to
capture many of these interactions will necessarily be too complex to be solved analytically. Second,
when modeling a complex, idiosyncratic policy debate of this nature, it is virtually impossible to
assemble a database rich enough to estimate statistically the large set of utility function parameters
that determine stakeholder preference between competing objectives. We thus need to assess the
sensitivity of predictions to a wide range of uncertain parameters. Finally, we focus on situations
where there is considerable uncertainty about the complex, relatively unstructured political terrain
within which conflicts will have to be resolved. We propose a general approach to addressing all
three challenges. This approach involves constructing a numerical political economic model that
can identify policies satisfying a relatively coarse “political viability” criterion and using Monte
Carlo simulation to assess the robustness of the model’s predictions with respect to our large set
of imprecisely known parameters.
Our approach is closely related to the “robust decisionmaking” approach developed to evaluate
problems characterized by “deep uncertainty.” Deep uncertainty refers to situations where the
researcher or affected parties cannot agree on how to characterize the problem in question in
one or more of the following ways: the appropriate set of conceptual relationships defining the
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problem and potential solutions, the probability distributions that represent uncertainty about key
relationships and parameters, and/or the desirability of alternative outcomes (Lempert; 2002).1 In
robust decisionmaking, computer simulations are used to generate a large ensemble of outcomes,
each based on a specific model. Rather than interpreting the results using summary statistics of
realized outcomes, as one would in a Monte Carlo setting, the results are interpreted as representing
modeling uncertainty. If a potential solution performs well for a substantial share of the simulations
then it is deemed robust. Lempert (2002) argues that robust decisionmaking does not need to
be based on a model known to make reliable forecasts. Rather, the model must be capable of
identifying key players, relationships, and potential states of the world well enough to identify
which potential strategies are likely to fare well under a wide range of specifications. At the same
time, the potential values of the individual elements of each specification are limited to realistic
ranges (Lempert; 2002). These ranges can be defined using expert opinion or other information.2
We adopt a similar approach. In this political economic context, just as in a decision-theoretic
context, the value of a single optimal solution based on a single model specification is less useful,
the more sensitive is the solution to uncertainty regarding the model specification (Lempert et al.
(2006)). An appropriate model may be sufficiently complex that a single specification cannot be
useful because the effects of the many assumptions it incorporates cannot be disentangled from
each other. Furthermore, probabilities play two distinct roles: first, the conventional one of repre-
senting the likelihood of realizations of states of the world, or known uncertainty; and second, the
provision of a framework for summarizing information about the effect of modeling uncertainty on
the performance of specific policies according to specific criteria (Lempert et al.; 2004). An impor-
tant distinction is that in the decision-theoretic context, the emphasis is on uncertainty about how
to model the impact of policies on outcomes of concern to stakeholders, while our emphasis is on
uncertainty about how to model the stakeholders’ preferences and the political process itself.
Our analysis is also related to the “robust control” and the “info-gap” literatures. Robust control
is a means of modeling ambiguity-averse preferences (Hansen and Sargent; 2001) that has been
applied to a number of environmental and natural resource problems.3 Info-gap theory, which
1 Deep uncertainty is closely related to the distinction between situations of “risk” and of “uncertainty” introduced to
economists by Frank Knight.
2 Methodologically, robust decisionmaking is very closely related to multi-model analysis and perturbed physics analysis,
which have been used extensively to model climate change, among other applications (For examples of this literature, see
Murphy et al. (2004); Piani et al. (2005); Stainforth et al. (2005); Rougier (2007); Dessai et al. (2009)).
2
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is designed to identify policies that decisionmakers can be confident will meet an acceptability
criterion (Ben-Haim; 2006), has been applied to environmental issues by Stranlund and Ben-Haim
(2008).
In the next section, we present our approach in a general setting. We then apply the approach to
a detailed case study of the debate over the future of California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
and illustrate the types of questions and answers the approach can give. Finally, we sketch the
application of the method to several other water and ecosystem policy debates to illustrate its
flexibility.
2. Predictive Political Economy Model
Our model is designed to assess the impact of particular exogenous factors on the outcome of an
imperfectly understood political process. The predictive approach we use has three key steps. First,
we construct a model of the political process under consideration. We incorporate our uncertainty
about this process by including a number of uncertain parameters in the model and by focusing on
models that yield predictions about sets of policies that might emerge rather than point predictions
of the policy that will emerge. Second, we use Monte Carlo simulations to generate probabilistic
predictions from our model for a large number of draws from the set of plausible parameter values.
Finally, we compare the probabilistic predictions under different values of the exogenous variables
of concern. Since our model yields set predictions rather than point predictions, we suggest two
approaches to summarizing the probabilistic information about these sets.
We begin by developing a highly stylized description of the specific components of the model and
describe the role they play in our analysis. First, we let λ describe the exogenous factors of interest.
The political process includes several stakeholders, and results in the selection of a specific policy
vector x from a set of policy options X. The impact of policy vectors on stakeholders’ well-being is
influenced by a vector z of model parameters about which researchers have imprecise information.
The vector z is drawn from the set of possible parameter values, Z. A political prediction concept
describes which policies might emerge from the process as a function of how they affect individual
3 Examples include environmental and energy planning (Babonneau et al.; 2010), extractive fisheries and water allocation
(Shaw and Woodward; 2008); (Woodward and Tomberlin; 2014), water management (Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas; 2004),
and biodiversity (Vardas and Xepapadeas; 2009).
3
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stakeholders. For a particular policy process, this concept identifies the set of policy vectorsW(z, λ)
deemed politically viable for the particular parameter vector z given the exogenous factors λ. Our
central goal is to assess how this set changes as λ changes.
This question is challenging to answer for two reasons. First, the answer will depend on the im-
precisely known parameters in z. Second, our political prediction approach yields sets of viable
policies rather than point predictions, requiring more complex characterization of how our predic-
tions change. In the settings we consider, there will not generally be a closed-form representation
of W(z, λ). We therefore develop a numerical model and use Monte Carlo simulation to draw z
vectors from Z. Looking across these simulations, we present two types of results. First, we sum-
marize by policy and compute a probabilistic political viability function V (x, λ) which tells us the
probability computed over possible realizations of our modeling uncertainty that a particular policy
is politically viable. Second, we use summary statistics M(W(z, λ)) to describe the feasible set
for different z vectors. These summary statistics include the size of the feasible set and the mean
values of policy vectors within the set. We can then assess the influence of the exogenous factors λ
on the political process by examining how the estimates of political viability for a particular policy
depend on the exogenous factors (first type of results) or on how our characterizations of the viable
sets depend on these factors (second type of results).
2.1. Utility Functions. In most applications, stakeholders derive utility not from a particular
policy per se, but from a vector y of outcomes that might result if the policy was implemented.
The relationship between policies and outcomes will generally be probabilistic and will depend on
the future state of the world s. The outcome of policy x conditional on the state of the world
s and the exogenous factors λ is denoted by y(x, s, λ). The distribution of possible states may
be influenced by the imprecisely known model parameters; we thus write the probability density
function over possible states as h(s, z, λ).
Since the outcome of any policy choice is uncertain, the representation of stakeholder utility must
reflect preferences over uncertain outcomes. The model can accommodate a variety of preferences.
In our applications, we assume that stakeholders are expected utility maximizers and thus define
4
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expected utility of each individual stakeholder given z and λ as
Eu (x, z, λ) =
w
u (y (x, s, λ, )) h (s, z, λ, ) ds.
Note that the uncertainty we are particularly concerned about in our modeling approach is not the
uncertain future state of the world. Our central concern is our uncertainty as modelers regarding
exactly what decisions stakeholders will make. While the decisions they make will be influenced by
the uncertainty about the future state of the world, our predictions about their decisions are also
influenced by our uncertainty regarding the precise structure of the model and the values of the
elements of z.4
2.2. Political Prediction Concepts. One element of our uncertainty about the stakeholders’
decision is that it is often difficult to construct a model of the political process that is sufficiently
detailed to yield credible predictions of the specific policy that will emerge from the process. This
difficulty arises even if it were the case that all of the specific values of the elements of z were
known with certainty. To address this concern, we broaden our predictions from the identification
of single points to the identification of sets of policies that are deemed viable. The identification of
what makes a policy viable is unique to the particular setting. In our detailed application to the
Delta debate, we focus on policies that Pareto dominate a default outcome.
To define the default, we specify what we expect to happen if the political process ends in a
stalemate. The default could be the outcome of any non-cooperative game, such as a Prisoners’
Dilemma. We then look for all Pareto improvements on the default.5 If each individual stakeholder
has the power to derail the political process, the only feasible outcomes are the default outcome itself
and the set of other policies that Pareto dominate this outcome. If the set of Pareto improvements
is empty for a particular z, then we predict no agreement. However, the existence of Pareto
improvements does not guarantee that stakeholders will successfully agree to implement one of
these solutions.
In other settings, it may be more appropriate to use different prediction concepts. For example, in
one of our secondary applications, we suggest using the core of a cooperative game as the political
4 If the value of a parameter is not known by the stakeholders, it is part of s.
5 Pareto optimal outcomes are only a subset of outcomes which Pareto dominate the default; a solution may Pareto dominate
the default and not be Pareto optimal.
5
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prediction concept. If a subset of stakeholders can impose a solution on other parties, we could
identify the set of policies preferred to the default by a large enough group of stakeholders to impose
a solution. If any potential solution would have to pass a referendum, we could identify voters with
different stakeholder groups and look at policies preferred to the status quo by at least 50% of the
population.
The chosen political viability prediction concept is represented by the correspondence W(z, λ)
which returns the set of all possible policy vectors in X that satisfy the chosen political viability
criterion. Our ultimate interest is in understanding how political viability is affected by the ex-
ogenous factor(s) included in λ by comparing W(z, λ1) and W(z, λ2). However, our prediction of
which policies are viable may depend in important and possibly unanticipated ways on the val-
ues of the large number of imprecisely known parameters in z. We consider two possible ways to
summarize the variability ofW(z, λ) across different values of z and examine changes as λ changes.
2.3. Probabilistic Viability of Policies. Our first summary approach considers the probability
that individual policies are politically viable. We define a probabilistic political viability function
V (x, λ) = PrZ (x ∈W (z, λ)) . (1)
that gives the probability computed over possible realizations of z that policy x satisfies our viability
criterion. To evaluate V (·) numerically for any given policy, we draw random vectors z from the
set of possible parameters and calculate the set of policies W(z, λ) that meet the political viability
criterion. We then calculate the fraction of these draws for which a given policy is an element
of W(z, λ) to calculate an approximation for V (x, λ). One way to summarize the effect of λ on
political viability is thus to look at how V (x, λ) varies with λ.
2.4. Robust Characterization of Viable Sets. Our second approach looks at how characteriza-
tions of the individual viable sets W(z, λ) vary across Z. Let Mj(W(z, λ)) be a summary statistic
about the set. Such statistics could include the size of the set, its expected value along some di-
mension of the policy space X or other measures of its dispersion or shape. The numerical solution
procedure described in the previous set allows us to look at the distribution hM (Mj ;λ) of these
summary statistics induced by the distribution of possible parameter vectors z. Comparing these
6
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distributions for different values of λ provides another way to look at how λ influences political
viability.
2.5. Caveats and Limitations. Implementation of the approach sketched above is subject to a
number of caveats and limitations. First, the modeler must have sufficient knowledge of the policy
problem, stakeholders’ objectives, and the underlying economic, biological, engineering and physical
systems which constrain the set of potential solutions to the negotiation problem. Omitting an
important stakeholder or key dimension of the policy space could result in model outcomes regarding
policy viability that are fundamentally distorted. Similarly, including too many dimensions of
secondary importance can add unnecessary complexity and muddy insights. Second, the political
prediction concept should correspond to the nature of the negotiation problem. For example,
if a simple majority is required, then the model should not require unanimity. Similarly, the
major characteristics of the default outcome must be identified. Third, implementing any model
of a complex policy problem invariably requires making assumptions about functional forms and
parameter values. Allowing unknown parameters to vary and evaluating the robustness of the
political viability of solutions to varying parameter values, as done in this approach, requires making
assumptions about the distribution of possible values, although the outcome is less restrictive than
selecting single values. Finally, the model is not a structural model of the negotiation process.
It neither imposes a solution concept nor explicitly considers strategic behavior by stakeholders.
All of these considerations suggest that designing a predictive model of a complex negotiation
process is subject to many limitations. While the approach is still subject to these limitations,
our more modest objective recognizes them explicitly. Rather than focusing on the structure
of the negotiation process or its specific outcome, however, the objective here is to assess which
potential solutions are more likely to prove viable over a wide range of specifications, as with robust
decisionmaking.
Recognizing these issues, we turn now to applying the model to a specific case study: California’s
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.
7
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3. Case Study: Politically Viable Solutions to California’s Delta Crisis
In this section, we illustrate our approach by using a political economic model of the Delta debate
to investigate how institutional mistrust affects the political viability of different policies. The
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta serves two critical needs for California: ecosystem services in the
form of habitat for many species and water infrastructure as the Delta serves as the hub of the state’s
water export system, conveying fresh water from the Sacramento River watershed to diversion
pumps in the southern Delta. While there has always been some competition between these needs,
the conflict between them has intensified in recent years. According to scientists, the water supply
system has affected the Delta ecosystem. Fish populations have crashed, and multiple species
are listed as threatened or endangered. Lawsuits filed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
have led to dramatic cuts in water exports (United States District Court; 2007), which in turn
have contributed to rising unemployment rates in many agricultural regions reliant on the Delta
for water. A multi-year drought has accentuated these difficulties. Moreover, the aging levees
protecting the man-made Delta islands are at risk of failure, including catastrophic simultaneous
failures due to earthquakes on the region’s faults.
California stakeholders are actively debating the Delta’s future. This debate centers around two
critical questions: first, how much water can be exported from the Delta watershed without violating
its economic and ecological integrity and, second, should the state build tunnels (or another isolated
conveyance structure) that would deliver water from the Sacramento River directly to diversion
pumps, avoiding the Delta entirely?
Several independent studies have considered how the state should respond to the Delta crisis (Bay
Delta Conservation Plan; 2007, 2009; Blue Ribbon Task Force; 2007, 2008; Cooley et al.; 2008;
Delta Vision Committee; 2008; Lund et al.; 2007, 2008, 2010; Michaels; 2012). There has also been
a literature focusing on the regulatory institutions involved in policy issues regarding the Delta as
a case study of collective governance (Holley; 2015; Kallis et al.; 2009; Fullerton; 2009; Hanemann
and Dyckman; 2009).
Madani and various coauthors have studied the Delta problem from a variety of modeling perspec-
tives, including bargaining theory, multi-criteria decision-making and social choice theory Madani
8
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and Lund (2011); Madani et al. (2011); Madani and Lund (2012); Shalikaran et al. (2011); Mokhtari
et al. (2012). With some exceptions, the conclusions of these papers are broadly consistent with
ours, although the details and methods of analysis are quite different. In particular, the papers
listed above are all “positive” in orientation, in the sense that they focus on identifying solutions
to the Delta problem, while our orientation is “negative,” in the sense that we focus on eliminating
potential solutions, on the grounds that they are Pareto dominated by the default. In this sense,
our approaches are complementary. In Madani and Lund (2011, p. 615), the authors conclude
that the status quo is unsustainable, and “is likely to be replaced by a more stable solution.” The
most likely alternative to the status quo, they believe, is tunnel construction; they are, however,
more optimistic than we are we that a negotiated tunnel solution will be reached. We both agree
that a solution involving no water exports is unlikely. The main theme of Madani and Lund (2012)
is that the Delta problem, viewed through a game-theoretic lens, has evolved from a Prisoner’s
Dilemma-type game to a game of Chicken:6 both parties would prefer to concede, and adopt an
Alternative Plan (Delta restoration or a conveyance facility), rather than maintain the status quo,
but each has an incentive to delay until the other party concedes, and bears the full cost of the
Alternative Plan. They conclude, as do we, that government intervention will likely be necessary,
in order to avert a Delta catastrophe. In Madani et al. (2011), the authors apply to the problem a
novel variant of bargaining theory, known as “Fallback Bargaining:” “bargainers start by indicat-
ing their preference orders over the alternatives. Then they fall back, in lockstep, to less and less
preferred alternatives until they find an alternative on which all bargainers agree” (p. 192). Once
again, the tunnel solution emerges as the most likely outcome. The paper also concludes that the
outcome “no agreement” is unlikely. In contrast, we find that if mistrust is high, there are many
parameterization of the model for which no agreement is possible.7 As in Madani and Lund (2011),
Mokhtari et al. (2012) adopts a Multi-criteria decision making approach to the problem, but in
this paper the focus is prescriptive rather than descriptive. They consider the problem facing a
benevolent dictator tasked with finding the fairest solution, using five different criteria for fairness.
Under all five criteria, the tunnel emerges as the best outcome, followed by dual conveyance. An
alternative prescriptive approach is adopted in Shalikaran et al. (2011), which applies a Monte-
Carlo social choice methodology to identify a socially optimal solution to the Delta problem, under
6 Conventionally, games of chicken (technically known as “wars of attrition”) are modeled as dynamic games (see Hendricks
et al. (1988) for a classical treatment). To simplify matters, Madani and Lund (2012) models the chicken game as a one-shot
game, while explaining heuristically how the game would evolve in a formal, dynamic framework.
7 See Figure 5 below.
9
The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000067
a variety of social choice rules. Once again the tunnel is the best outcome, for all but one of the
rules considered.
Existing analyses exclude a key component of stakeholder interactions: a lack of trust that negoti-
ated solutions will be implemented. A lack of trust among stakeholder groups often characterizes
the class of complex policy problems our modeling approach is designed to address. In this appli-
cation, one of the obstacles to reaching a solution regarding water exports and the Delta is that
key stakeholder groups have expressed serious mistrust in the institutions that would implement
any solution. A significant source of concern among environmental groups is that the tunnels will
not be operated in accordance with environmental protection laws and the ESA. These groups
have expressed a fundamental lack of trust in existing water management institutions, noting that
these are the same institutions that failed to prevent the current crisis. Other opponents, including
in-Delta water users and Sacramento Valley water users, also express mistrust.
We now describe briefly the policy options commonly discussed for the Delta, and then describe
how we implement our modeling approach for this case study. Among the studies of the Delta,
Lund et al. (2008) was particularly influential, and was the technical base for Lund et al. (2010).
Our analysis draws heavily on it for parameterizations. Its authors argue that there are four basic
strategies available to the government: stop exporting water from the Delta altogether, invest in
reinforcing the Delta’s levees and continue exporting water through it, build a canal, tunnel or other
isolated conveyance system to carry exports around the Delta, or combine the last two alternatives
in a dual conveyance system where some water is exported through the Delta and some around it
using an isolated conveyance system.
Both the tunnel only and the dual conveyance options contemplate the construction of a large
isolated conveyance structure that could in principle increase the total export capacity of the
system. Many groups, including in-Delta interests and some environmentalists, have repeatedly
expressed concerns that if such a structure were built, its entire capacity would be maximally utilized
regardless of stated intentions to lower the level of exports.8 This concern has been exacerbated
8 Blogger Dan Bacher voices a widely held view: “Although the Delta Vision Task Force’s report recommended that less
water be exported out of the Delta to help the estuary’s collapsing ecosystem, canal opponents note that the construction
of a canal with increased water export capacity would inevitably be used to export more water out of the system.... I have
repeatedly asked canal advocates to give me one example, in U.S. or world history, where the construction of a big diversion
canal has resulted in less water being taken out of a river system. I have also asked them to give me one example, in U.S.
or world history, where the construction of a big diversion canal has resulted in a restored or improved ecosystem. None of
the canal backers have been able to answer either one of these two questions” (Bacher; 2009).
10
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by calls from engineers to choose the tunnels’ capacity to match engineering constraints rather
than to implement any particular export level. The reason for this approach is compelling: large
tunnels would provide maximum flexibility to time export flows during the least environmentally
damaging time periods. However, the approach would build in substantial excess capacity, fueling
fears of exports greater than those agreed upon. More broadly, Holley (2015) documents that many
actors fear that stakeholders will invalidate all or part of any agreement using the court system.
These fears are a source of mistrust regarding other stakeholders’ commitment to comply with
agreed-upon export levels after the tunnels are constructed. Limiting the maximum capacity of the
tunnels limits the maximum exports in the event stakeholders do renege on their commitments.
3.1. A Computable Political Economic Model of the Delta Debate. In this subsection, we
apply the approach described in Section 2 to predict the influence of institutional mistrust on the
political viability of the different approaches to resolving the Delta crisis. We capture institutional
mistrust by letting the exogenous factor λmeasure the probability that water managers will reneg on
the agreement about export levels, and an isolated conveyance will ultimately be filled to capacity.
Our model includes five broadly specified stakeholder groups: urban users of exported water, the
agricultural regions of the San Joaquin Valley that rely on exported water, environmentalists,
state taxpayers, and in-Delta interests. These groups have conflicting concerns about the financial,
ecological, and employment impacts of the possible options available to the government. Since we
are interested in generating predictions that are robust to our uncertainty, the parameters in each
group’s utility functions are included in our uncertain parameter vector z.
3.1.1. Possible Policies. Each of the four solutions described above can be represented as a vector
(xex, xshr) where xex is the total amount of water exported and xshr is the share of exports routed
around the Delta through the twin tunnels.
Our simulations consider values of xex between 0 and 7.5 million acre feet (maf).
9 xshr varies from
zero to one. Prior to the court-mandated cutbacks, exports averaged approximately 6 maf; we refer
to this as the pre-2007 export level. Tunnel size is not a policy choice in our model; we assume that
if constructed tunnels will be sized based on engineering considerations as recommended by Lund
9 Lund et al. (2008) identify 7.6 maf as the maximum level of exports consistent with minimum flow constraints on the
Sacramento River.
11
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Table 1. Costs of various export regimes and how they are allocated
Cost Allocation Dependence on Export Regime
Reduced exports Agricultural and urban water users Increases as total exports decline
Water treatment Agricultural and urban water users Increases as total amount of water exported
through Delta increases
Levee maintenance Primarily taxpayers; also agricultural
and urban water users
Increases as total amount of water exported
through Delta increases
Repair Taxpayers Constant, but only paid if no canal is built,
either initially or after disaster
Canal Construction Mostly water users; also taxpayers Constant for any level of canal exports; also
paid if canal is built following collapse
Collapse Water users and taxpayers Constant, but only paid if no canal is built
et al. (2008). The parameterization is self-explanatory for each of the strategies except the dual
conveyance alternative. Because the report does not include a precise description of how a dual
conveyance plan would allocate exports between the isolated conveyance system and through-Delta
pumping, we match their outcomes estimates with our policies by assuming their estimates apply
to exports divided evenly between the two export paths.
3.1.2. Stakeholders and utility functions. The outcomes of interest to our stakeholders include sev-
eral different costs that are allocated among stakeholders, the possibility of fish extinction, agri-
cultural employment in the San Joaquin Valley, and inflows to the Delta. Different export regimes
impose different types of costs that are shared among three stakeholder groups: agricultural users,
urban users and taxpayers.10 The model includes five specific costs: costs due to reduced water
exports, water treatment costs, levee maintenance costs, repair costs following a major collapse,
and costs associated with a major collapse of the levee system. 11
Table 1 summarizes the allocation of these costs and the key pathways through which the policy
vector x influences them. Several of the costs are borne only in the event that tunnels either are
10 Lund et al. (2008) report upper and lower bounds on the total cost and environmental impact for each alternative. These
values were derived from upper and lower bounds on a number of specific input variables. We use the same upper and
lower bounds for these inputs. Because our interest is in the negotiation between stakeholders, we disaggregated total costs
into costs paid by each stakeholder. Because we model continuous policy decisions regarding total exports and the share of
exports routed through the twin tunnels, we made some additional assumptions to allow us to predict costs for variations
in the share of exports that flow through the tunnels and for lower export levels than considered by Lund et al. (2008).
These adjustments are described in detail in the appendix.
11 The costs included in the cost of a levee collapse are the costs of a sudden disruption of water supplies during the transition
period until either the levees are repaired or tunnels are constructed. They do not cover all potential consequences of a
collapse, most importantly the costs to in-Delta interests of a catastrophic collapse. In-Delta concerns about costs associated
with levee collapse are captured by including levee maintenance in their utility function as described on p. 13.
12
The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000067
or are not constructed. As a result, the mapping from policies to outcomes is discontinuous when
moving from xshr = 0 to xshr > 0.
The following list introduces the arguments of each stakeholder group’s utility function. We use the
two letter code after each group’s title as shorthand to identify groups. Each group’s preferences over
outcomes induce preferences over policy variables, in sometimes complex ways. Each stakeholder
group has a CES utility function defined over the components of the outcome vector that we assume
affect its utility, with the exception of environmentalists as discussed below.
State taxpayers (Tp): Taxpayers are concerned with reducing the government’s total expendi-
ture liability and are risk neutral. The two major (variable) determinants of the govern-
ment’s liability are the cost of levee maintenance, which increases with the amount of water
exported through the Delta, and the costs of a major collapse, borne only if tunnels do not
exist. Thus Tp’s utility is increasing in xshr, decreasing in xex, and increases discontinuously
when moving from xshr = 0 to xshr > 0.
Urban users (Ur): This group is an aggregate of urban interests in Southern California and the
San Francisco Bay Area. It is concerned with minimizing the cost of meeting its water supply
needs. Delta exports are cheaper than alternatives, so urban user utility increases with
xex. Moreover, both water treatment costs and the probability of cutbacks for ecosystem
protection decrease as water exports are shifted from the Delta to the twin tunnel, so Ur’s
utility also increases with xshr.
Agricultural users(Ag): This group represents agricultural interests in the San Joaquin Valley
that rely on water exported through the Delta. The two arguments in Ag’s utility function
are farming profits and agricultural employment. Ag’s preferences are very similar to those
of Ur, although Ag’s utility decreases faster than Ur’s as xex falls because Ag’s profits and
agricultural employment both decline.
In-Delta interests (Dt): This group is a composite of local residents, farmers, and recreational
users within the Delta. The two arguments of Dt’s utility function are Delta inflows and
levee maintenance. The first argument proxies the quality of water in the Delta, which is
highly correlated with Delta inflows. In the absence of tunnels, Delta inflows are determined
by factors exogenous to the model—hydrological variables and upstream diversions.12 If
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tunnels are built, then any water exported through them would reduce inflows into the Delta.
The second argument, levee maintenance, is a function of the amount of water exported
through the Delta: any agreed-upon policy package will allocate funds for levee maintenance
according to a formula that increases with through-Delta exports. Both impacts imply that
Dt’s utility decreases with xshr. The impact of increasing xex depends on the value of xshr.
At high values of xshr increasing exports reduces Dt’s utility due to reduced inflows; at low
values of xshr, Dt’s utility increases with exports due to increased levee maintenance.
Environmentalists (Ev): Ev is concerned exclusively with the survival of two fish species: Delta
smelt and salmon. We define four state-dependent utility levels for Ev, similar to Woodward
and Shaw (2008). If both species survive, Ev’s utility is 1; if neither survive it is zero. If only
one of the two species survive, Ev’s utility is some number between 0 and 1, depending on
which species survives. Ev’s expected utility thus increases as the probabilities of survival
increase and hence decreases with xex. Following Lund et al. (2008), we assume that for
a given level of xex, survival probabilities are higher when a relatively large share of those
exports flows through an isolated conveyance. The precise dependence of survival on xshr
is described in more detail in the results section.
All of the outcomes defined above (various costs, the possibility of fish species extinction, agricul-
tural employment and Delta inflows) are contingent on the state of the world s, which incorporates
all of the uncertainty that stakeholders confront. This uncertainty includes uncertainty about how
fish populations will respond to changes in water export regimes (Hanak et al.; 2013), uncertainty
about the level and/or allocation of various costs, the unknown occurrence and timing of a major
levee collapse, and the possibility that the export regime will eventually diverge from the negoti-
ated regime for one of three reasons: possible changes in exports following a levee collapse, court
mandated cutbacks due to the ESA, or political pressure from water user groups.
Each participant in the political process has a utility function defined over outcomes that depends
on the parameter vector z and makes decisions based on the expected utility over possible states
of the world. In the appendix, we provide a detailed description of all the uncertainty facing
12 California’s multi-year drought suggests that additional elements of stakeholder uncertainty could include expectations
regarding the effects of climate change on average inflows and inflow variability. We omit those considerations here; the
likely primary impact on the analysis would be to increase users’ willingness to accept lower water exports, but the qualitative
results would be unaffected because groups’ fundamental interests would not change.
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stakeholders, how we map a particular policy to possible outcomes, and the precise specification of
each group’s utility function.
3.1.3. Political Prediction Concept. The political negotiations over the future of the Delta are
complex. We do not attempt to explicitly model the strategic interactions between parties. Instead,
we focus on identifying policies that are or are not “politically viable.” Sacramento Bee political
reporter Dan Walters has commented on the “unwritten rule” in California that “any major policy
decree must have virtually unanimous support from every stakeholder group or it will ultimately
fail because opponents have so many political ways to kill it” (Walters; 2010). This implies that
any negotiated solution to the Delta crisis must be acceptable to all stakeholder groups.13 Given
a “default outcome” that will be implemented if the participants in the political process cannot
negotiate an agreement, the set of politically viable policies W (z, λ) is thus the set of alternatives
that Pareto dominate this outcome when the model is parameterized by z given mistrust level λ.
If W (z, λ) is non-empty, it is possible, but no means certain, that the stakeholders will reach an
agreement.14
The default outcome in our model has deterministic and random components. Like Madani and
Lund (2011), we assume that if stakeholders cannot agree on a policy alternative, then no major
policy change will be implemented. As a result, no tunnels will be built and no money will be spent
on maintaining the levees, so the probability of a massive levee failure will increase. Apart from
a massive levee failure, the issue of primary concern to stakeholders under the default outcome is
the level of water exports. This level is uncertain. As in the case of agreement, the actual level of
13 An alternative, non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to the Delta negotiations is provided by Madani and Lund (2011),
who consider six “stability” concepts: one is Nash equilibrium, the other five extend Nash’s notion in ways that are more
realistic in various ways. Their payoffs assume that movement away from the status quo requires agreement from all parties.
Their analysis predicts that in many cases, stakeholders will fail to reach an agreement despite the existence of Pareto
improving policies.
14 As a criterion for political viability, Pareto dominance has an obvious shortcoming: each stakeholder in the model is assumed
to have veto power over the decision-making process. In this respect, it is a flawed representation of virtually every actual
political process: either it endows some modeled stakeholders with more power than they actually have, or it excludes from
the model stakeholders who, though lacking veto power, may have considerable political influence. Our model may overstate
the power of in-Delta interests to veto an agreement and omits another interest group with some degree of power in the
negotiations – agricultural users upstream of the Delta – due to lack of data. In the former instance, the set of politically
viable options will be underestimated; an option can fail to meet our criterion because it is unacceptable to some stakeholder
that in the real world would lack the political clout to block it. In the latter instance, the set will be overestimated; it will
include policy options that are acceptable to all of the stakeholders with veto power, but in the real world would not survive
the combined opposition of multiple stakeholders, none of whom had the political power to veto the outcome unilaterally. It
is nonetheless a helpful exercise to identify the Pareto dominant set. In particular, as section 4 will demonstrate, it can be
especially instructive to learn that certain highly publicized possibilities fail to satisfy even this relatively modest selection
criterion.
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default exports will depend on whether or not fish populations show signs of recovery and whether
export reductions are imposed if they do not.
The vector of default outcomes, contingent on the state of the world s and the parameters vector
z, is given by yd (s, z) and the default distribution function over possible outcomes is given by
hd (s, z). By definition, both functions are independent of any policy vector and of the level of λ
since no tunnels will be built in the default. The vector of expected default utilities is given by
Eud (z) =
w
u
(
yd (s, z) , z
)
h (s, z) ds
and the Pareto dominant (PD) set W(z, λ) for a given z and λ is thus the set of all policy options
that satisfy
Eui (x, z, λ) ≥ Eu
d
i (z)
for every stakeholder i.
There is no closed form solution for W(z, λ), so we evaluate it numerically. For a given parameter
vector z, we compute players’ payoffs for each policy and for the default outcome for a large number
of draws of the state of nature s. We then take expectations over these draws to identify the PD
set.
3.2. Modeling Uncertainty. If z were known with certainty, we could simply repeat the pro-
cedure described in the last paragraph for different levels of λ and compare the resulting sets to
determine the influence of mistrust on possible negotiated solutions. Our challenge is that these
sets vary in important ways on the precise parameterization of stakeholders’ utility functions and
the default distribution over states of the world. In Table 2, we list the elements of z for our appli-
cation along with the upper and lower bounds we considered plausible. Because we have no basis
for specifying an informative prior over these intervals, the principle of insufficient reason dictates
that each element should be independently and uniformly distributed over the interval we specify
as its support.
Specifying an interval for the potential value of an unknown parameter is always arbitrary, to some
degree. Similarly, better information regarding values and intervals can be incorporated into a
16
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simulation analysis if it becomes available. Using outside information when available, we set the
bounds reported in Table 2 to allow utility functions to exhibit a variety of behaviors while seeking
to mitigate the influence of extreme values. Ag and Dt have utilities dependent on two factors. In
the absence of specific information on their relative importance to the stakeholders, a natural base
point is to assume equal weights, or 0.5 for each factor. We specify a lower bound of 0.2 and an
upper bound of 0.8 for the weight placed on each factor, with pairs of weights summing to 1. These
bounds encompass a broad set of possible weights and it seems unlikely that the weights would
be outside these limits for Ag, a player concerned with the value of agricultural production and
employment. Dt values levee maintenance and inflows to the Delta because they both determine his
(expected) water supply, and there is no reason to expect one to be dramatically more important
than the other. The ranges of elasticities of substitution between the two factors in Ag’s and Dt’s
utilities include both elastic and inelastic values. We set the upper bound on the risk aversion
coefficient for all stakeholders to 1 to include the possibility of risk neutral (but not risk-loving)
stakeholders. We set the lower bound of 0.2 to include the possibility of very risk averse stakeholders
because we know very little about the risk preferences of the different stakeholder groups. In the
results, we briefly discuss how tightening these bounds would affect our results. Ev’s utility if only
one species survives varies from 0.25 to 0.75, compared to his utility of 1 if both survive. This range
allows for his utility function to be either submodular or supermodular in the survival of the two
species, limiting the conceptual restrictiveness of the selected range. Regarding variation around
the mean (“spread” in the table) for the default export distribution, we chose a lower bound of
zero in order to allow for the case of complete certainty. The maximum bound allows for exports in
the default to be as much as 2 maf above or below the mean. This bound is specified based on the
maximum level of exports consistent with flow constraints by Lund et al. (2008), 7.6 maf. Allowing
2 maf as the maximum difference means that realized exports in the default could be above or
below the mean by as much as slightly more than 25 percent of the maximum export level.
4. Delta Results
The model described in the previous section yields predictions about the impact of institutional
mistrust on the viability of policies. We first discuss our predictions under the counterfactual
assumption that we know for certain that each element of the parameter vector z is equal to its
17
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Table 2. Elements of modeling uncertainty and their distributions
Variable Lower Bound Upper Bound
Weight on jobs vs money in Ag utility 0.2 0.8
Weight on maintenance vs inflows in Dt utility 0.2 0.8
Constant in Dt utility 0.05 0.15
Ag elasticity of substitution 0.5 1.5
Dt elasticity of substitution 0.5 1.5
Ag risk aversion coefficient 0.2 1
Dt risk aversion coefficient 0.2 1
Ur risk aversion coefficient 0.2 1
Ev utility if only smelt survive∗ 0.25 0.75
Ev utility if only salmon survive∗ 0.25 0.75
Spread of default export distribution above and below mean (maf) 0 2
∗ Ev utility is scaled so that 0 represents the utility if neither species survives and 1 represents the
utility if both survive.
expected value. The results are counterintuitive and potentially misleading. We then incorporate
our uncertainty about the true parameter vector and use the probabilistic assessments described in
our model section to demonstrate that the impact of mistrust is highly dependent on the precise
parameterization and that mistrust itself decreases the robustness of our viability predictions.
4.1. Known Parameters. We begin by setting z equal to its expected value z¯ and specifying
perfect trust (λ = 0) and discuss the resulting PD set in considerable detail. The set is illustrated
in Figure 1. The boundaries of Figure 1 coincide with the boundaries of the policy space. Moving
from left to right in the diagram, the total amount of water exports, xex, increases; moving from
the bottom to the top, the percentage of the exports flowing through the tunnels, xshr, increases.
15 The filled stars in the figure depict the four policy alternatives discussed in detail in Lund et al.
(2008).
Each contour line depicted in Figure 1 identifies the set of policy options which yield that group
expected utility equal to its expected utility from the default outcome. The arrows attached to
each constraint line are gradient vectors, pointing into the region of the policy space which the
stakeholder group prefers to the default. W(z¯;λ = 0) is the shaded area.
The shapes of the participation constraints in Figure 1 reflect the preferences of the various stake-
holder groups. Ag and Ur will veto policies that involve low levels of exports. Both groups will
15 Note that the volumetric distinction between vertically differentiated points shrinks to zero as their horizontal location
moves to the left of the diagram: in the limit, obviously, there is no distinction between different fractions of zero.
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Figure 1. The PD set with perfect trust conditional on z¯
.
2 4 6
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x
ex
:  Total Exports (maf)
x s
hr
: 
  
Fr
ac
tio
n 
th
ru
 tu
nn
el
s
Ag
Ur
Tx
Ev
Dt
Pre
−20
07
ex
por
t le
vel
Twin Tunnels
Dual Conv
No Exports
Thru Delta
trade slightly smaller total exports for larger shares through the tunnels, but are concerned primar-
ily with achieving a high base level of exports; consequently, their participation constraints slope
steeply downward. They will also veto policies with very low shares conveyed through the tunnels
because they will not find it worth the cost of construction. Tp will veto policy vectors in the lower
right corner of the space because the levels of exports through the Delta, and hence expenditures
on levee maintenance, will be the highest in this region.
Ev will veto policies that involve high levels of exports, although this group is more willing to
accept exports if they are routed at least partially through the tunnels. This reflects the conclusion
in Lund et al. (2008) that fish populations are more likely to recover under either a dual con-
veyance or isolated conveyance system option than if exports are pumped exclusively through the
Delta.16 For Dt, the two outputs which matter—freshwater inflows to the Delta and expenditures
on levee maintenance—both decrease with exports through tunnels; hence Dt will veto policies in
the uppermost region of the policy space. Dt will accept even very high levels of xex provided
xshr is sufficiently low because levee maintenance expenditures increase with total exports. As xex
increases, there is a decline in the maximum level of xshr that is acceptable to Dt. It is surprising
that Dt is willing to accept such a large fraction of the available alternatives, since Delta interests
16 The precise shape of Ev’s participation constraint is due to the specification of the fish survival probabilities and the
assumption that the isolated conveyance option splits exports equally between the conveyance structure and the Delta. It
does not drive the results of the analysis.
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have always vociferously opposed an isolated conveyance structure. The reason is that these alter-
natives are being compared to a default outcome that is extremely unsatisfactory in expectation:
unless some kind of agreement is negotiated, expenditures on levee maintenance will be minimal,
increasing the probability of a major levee collapse, which would be devastating to Dt.
This analysis has three implications for the policy question we consider. First, W(z¯;λ = 0) is
nonempty for the parameter vector z¯ of modeling uncertainty; there do exist policies that Pareto
dominate the default. This suggests that if the model, when parameterized by z¯, is a reasonable
stylization of the actual political process, some negotiated solution might emerge from the political
process, although our model does not rule out the possibility of a stalemate leaving us at the
default. Second, for a policy to be acceptable to all stakeholders under this parameterization, at
least half of all exports will flow through the tunnels. Finally, under this parameterization at least
three of the four options discussed by Lund et al. (2008) would be vetoed by some group. Whether
or not the fourth option—dual conveyance—would be vetoed depends on how the option would be
implemented. It would be vetoed for a large majority of xshr values.
We then ask whether the existence of policies that Pareto dominate the default is contingent
upon perfectly trustworthy institutions by progressively increasing the value of λ, again restricting
attention to one parameterization of the model, z¯. Figure 2 is the analog of Figure 1 for all four
levels of mistrust. The first panel replicates Figure 1. The percentage number printed inside of
each set W(z¯;λ) indicates the size of this set relative to the entire policy space.
All of the costs for which Tp is responsible are independent of the level of mistrust, so the group’s
participation constraint is independent of the level of mistrust. The successive increases in mistrust
induce shifts in all other stakeholders’ participation constraints and, hence, the location and size
of the PD set. The PD set shifts down and left, and increases in size. The acceptable policies are
characterized by fewer total exports and a smaller share of those exports through the tunnels.17
The leftward shift in the PD set is due to participation constraints for Ag, Ur and Ev all moving to
the left. Consequently, the PD set excludes outcomes with relatively high total exports that were
17 The shift toward lower agreed upon export levels depicted in the figure is not surprising, but this figure tells only part of the
story. As mistrust increases, so does the probability that water exports will fill the tunnels to capacity. Hence the reduction
in expected actual exports and the actual share of those exports flowing through the tunnels associated with alternatives in
the PD set is less than the figure would suggest; expected values of both may in fact increase.
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Figure 2. Impact of mistrust on the location of PD set with parameterization z¯
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part of the PD set when there was less mistrust, and includes outcomes with smaller total exports.
At higher levels of mistrust, Ag and Ur are willing to accept an agreement with lower total exports
because they believe they may be able to use political or legal pressure to increase exports through
the tunnels in the future despite the agreement. Ev’s participation constraint moves to the left for
the same reason.18
The downward shift (reduction in share through the tunnels) is driven primarily by Dt. Greater
mistrust reduces the declared share of water transported through the tunnels that Dt is willing
to accept given declared total exports. Consequently, Dt’s constraint increasingly limits the set of
18 It also exhibits an increase in curvature that is dependent on the specific functional form for fish survival and has little
impact on the results.
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possible agreements. When trust is not an issue, Dt is a relatively obliging negotiating partner: the
fraction of possible alternatives that this group is willing to accept is higher than that of any other
group. As mistrust increases, this fraction declines more than proportionately. Once the probability
of a trust violation reaches 0.6, the fraction of alternatives that Dt will accept is strikingly small.
The model thus suggests that a critical factor driving Dt’s highly publicized opposition to the
proposed tunnels is its strong belief that agreed upon restrictions on exports are unlikely to be
honored in practice.
In addition to shifting down and left, the PD set’s size increases monotonically with mistrust, from
8% to 14% of the entire space. While this result seems counter-intuitive at first glance, it can be
explained by two factors. First, Ag’s and Ur’s constraints are shifting left at a significantly faster
rate than Ev’s, increasing the width of the PD set. Second, the interaction between Tp’s and Dt’s
participation constraints causes the PD set to be much narrower at its right-hand edge than at
its left-hand edge; at high levels of total exports, the interval of export shares that are acceptable
to all parties is much smaller than at low levels of total exports. As a consequence, even if Ev’s
and Ag and/or Ur’s constraints were to shift left with mistrust at the same rate, the PD set would
increase in size: a “short” column would be eliminated from the set, while a “tall” column would
be added. Both factors are clearly dependent on the interplay among a large number of utility
function parameters.
4.2. The Effect of Parameter Uncertainty. To determine whether we can be confident that
increasing mistrust will increase the size of the viable set and shift it to the left and downward,
we repeat the analysis above for 1,000 draws from the set of possible parameter vectors Z and
summarize the results in two ways. We first evaluate the probabilistic political viability function
at each element of the policy space, X. We then measure the size of each PD set and compute the
average levels of total exports and tunnel shares within each PD set. We first present the results
assuming perfect trust and then discuss how mistrust affects these measures.
4.2.1. Perfect trust. Figure 3 partitions X into regions depending on the probability that each
policy belongs to the PD set. A policy is termed RPV if it Pareto dominates the default for at
least 80% of the realizations of modeling uncertainty; such policies are marked in the figure with
the largest solid circles. Policies that are politically viable for at least one parameterization are
22
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Figure 3. Probability of Pareto dominance with perfect trust
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referred to as politically viable (PV). The PV set includes all of the points identified with some
marker in the figure. Finally, policies in the white (unmarked) region are said to be NPV. (For
ease of comparison the solid line is the boundary of the PD set for the parameterization z¯ plotted
in Figure 1.) Figure 3 is in some sense similar to Figure 1; both suggest that most of the policies
that have some chance of emerging from the political process involve export levels less than pre-
2007 levels which are routed primarily, but not exclusively, through the twin tunnels. Yet, Figure
3 contains far more information than Figure 1 because it considers the implications of modeling
uncertainty for the political feasibility of the examined policies.
One critical difference between the two figures is the interpretation of the unmarked regions of the
policy space. Policies in the unmarked region of Figure 1 are Pareto dominated by the default for
the single parameterization z¯. By contrast, unmarked policies in Figure 3 are NPV; they are Pareto
dominated by the default for all realizations of modeling uncertainty in our sample. As discussed in
our model specification, we intentionally set very wide bounds on the modeling uncertainty in our
analysis to be conservative in identifying policies as NPV. Narrowing the bounds on our uncertainty
could expand the white space defining the NPV policies, while expanding the ranges could decrease
the white space by expanding the set of PV policies.
A striking property of the figure is that all four policy options described in Lund et al. (2008) are
NPV as shown by the locations of the four stars in the unshaded area. All points on the graph’s
left edge (corresponding to ceasing all exports) and its bottom edge (corresponding to routing all
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exports through the Delta) are NPV, not just the two proposed solutions. Lund et al. (2008)
were similarly skeptical of all alternatives lacking an isolated conveyance structure, noting that
a policy of stopping all exports is simply too expensive for the state despite its environmental
benefits, while continuing to rely exclusively on through-Delta exports carries unacceptable risks
to both water supply reliability and the ecosystem. Moreover, all points on the top edge of the
graph (corresponding to pure isolated conveyance alternatives) are also NPV. These alternatives
are always vetoed by at least one stakeholder. If export levels are too low to justify the cost
of construction, water users are unwilling to pay for the tunnels. On the other hand, if export
levels are too high, Dt will veto any pure tunnel alternative because reduced Delta inflows cause
two negative consequences: water quality in the Delta will decline relative to the default and
expenditures on levee maintenance will remain at zero. Finally, the analysis suggests that a dual
conveyance alternative with pre-2007 exports evenly split between the tunnels and the Delta is
NPV, although other dual conveyance configurations are PV.
The set of RPV policies in Figure 3 is considerably smaller than the shaded set W(z¯; 0) in Figure
1. While just under 9% of the policy space belongs to W(z¯; 0), less than 1% of the policy space
is RPV. Put another way, less than 10% of the policies inside the solid line are RPV, although
almost all of them satisfy the Pareto criterion with probability at least 40%. There is no policy
which Pareto dominates the default for more than 85% of the realizations of z. This illustrates the
obvious point that inclusion in the PD set for the mean realization of modeling uncertainty (or any
other realization) is no guarantee of robust political viability.
4.2.2. Impact of mistrust. The first panel of Figure 4 replicates Figure 3; the remaining panels
show the impact of increasing mistrust, i.e., increasing probability that water managers will reneg
on the negotiated agreement about water export levels. Legends for these figures are the same as
for Figure 3. In each panel, we overlay for reference the boundaries of the shaded set W(z¯;λ) in
the corresponding panel of Figure 2. As mistrust increases, the set of PV policies increases; this
effect is driven primarily by the participation constraints for Ag and Ur slackening. As discussed
on pp. 21-22, the more likely it is that the tunnels will be utilized to capacity, the more willing
Ag and Ur will be to accept somewhat lower values of xex and xshr. The size of this effect depends
on how their utility functions are parameterized. Mistrust thus decreases the number of policies
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Figure 4. Impact of mistrust on the probability of Pareto dominance
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we can be confident will not emerge from the political process. This conclusion is consistent
with the increasing size of the PD sets in Figure 2. On the other hand, the set of RPV policies
shrinks dramatically, virtually disappearing even for λ = 0.2. In other words, as mistrust increases,
it becomes increasingly difficult (and eventually impossible) to identify policies that we can be
confident are Pareto improvements on the default. Unsurprisingly, none of the four policy options
from Lund et al. (2008) becomes RPV as mistrust increases.
We next explore the impact of mistrust by examining the distribution hM (M, λ) of three summary
statistics about the individual PD sets: their size, the average total export level and the average
share exported through the twin tunnels. Box plots of these distributions are shown in Figure 5.
In each panel, for each value of λ, the solid horizontal line indicates the median value across our
sample from Z for the measure being plotted. The thick, squat rectangles denote 95% confidence
intervals for the population medians. The thin, elongated rectangles denote the interquartile ranges
25
The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000067
Figure 5. Distribution of set measures across modeling uncertainty
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of the sample data, and the whiskers (thin, dashed lines) indicate the support of the sample data.19
At the bottom of each panel, the filled ovals corresponding to each λ indicate the probability that
the PD set is empty; the area of the oval is proportional to the percentage of parameterizations for
which the PD sets are empty, given that level of mistrust.
Several conclusions emerge from this figure. First, as mistrust increases, there is a striking increase
in the percentage of parameterizations for which the PD set is empty. At low levels of mistrust,
we are fairly confident that there are policies that PD the default, suggesting the potential for a
negotiated solution. At high levels of mistrust, there is a striking decrease in this confidence as
30% of our parameterizations have an empty PD set when λ reaches 0.6. Yet, even at this very
high level of mistrust, our model predicts a non-empty PD set nearly 70% of the time.
The left panel of Figure 5 also tells us that the median size of the Pareto setW(·;λ) varies little with
λ, while both the inter-quartile range and the support of the entire sample increase dramatically.
This tells us two things: first, the conclusion from Figure 2 that the PD set increases in size is not
robust to our uncertainty about the parameterization of our model because we see no consistent
trend in the size of the PD set. Moreover, mistrust exacerbates our uncertainty about the size of the
19 As with the probabilistic viability results, the support of these measures is determined by the support of the modeling
uncertainty. Contracting the modeling uncertainty ranges could decrease the ranges in Figure 5, while expanding the
modeling uncertainty ranges could expand them.
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PD set. At low levels of mistrust, the size of the PD sets varies within a relatively small range. As
mistrust increases, the size of the PD set becomes more dependent on the specific parameterization.
Some of our parameterizations suggest that over 30% of the policy options in our grid are PD, while
a large fraction suggest an empty PD set.
The center and right panels tell us that we can be reasonably confident that the PD sets do indeed
move down and to the left as suggested by Figure 2. Moreover, the middle panel shows that mistrust
has little impact on the horizontal dispersion of the PD sets; the lengths of the interquartile ranges
and the sample data support remain more or less constant as mistrust increases. Mistrust thus
has little impact on our confidence in our ability to predict the total export levels included in the
PD set. However, in the right panel, we see that the vertical dispersion of the PD sets increases
with mistrust, especially at high levels. As mistrust increases, we become much less confident in
how much of the negotiated exports will flow through the canal. It thus becomes much harder for
us to identify specific policies we are confident PD the default, even as we continue to predict the
existence of a PD set in most of our parameterizations.
5. Other applications
The Delta case study presented in the previous two sections offers a detailed look at how our
approach works in practice. The core elements of the approach can be extended to a variety
of debates. In this section, we sketch how our method could be applied to several other policy
negotiations involving tradeoffs between water supplies, ecosystem benefits, and other objectives
that have been modeled by previous authors. In each case, the authors focused on outcomes
that satisfy a particular solution concept and asked how some change(s) in political, economic, or
institutional factors would change the solution.
Applying our approach to these same negotiations would complement the existing analyses in two
important ways. First, by including a large number of model parameters in the uncertain vector z,
we would generate more robust predictions of the impact of the changes considered by the authors.
Second, by focusing on a coarser prediction concepts that identify sets of policies that might emerge
from negotiations, we generate predictions that are consistent with a broader set of game theoretic
models.
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5.1. Mekong Basin. Conflicts between countries, water users, hydropower and ecosystems are
intense in the Mekong river basin in southeast Asia. Houba et al. (2013) construct a regional
hydrological model whose policy space includes the operation and construction of a number of
dams, as well as water use by different sectors within China, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Their
model traces the impact of these choices on four different groups within each country (hydropower,
irrigation, environmental users, and households). Pham Do and Dinar (2014) build on this analysis
by considering the impact of expanding the policy space to also include trade liberalization between
the countries. Both studies investigate the impact of strengthening the governance of the Mekong
River Commission (MRC), an organization of four lower basin states (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam).
Our approach could be applied to generate robust predictions of the impact of strengthening the
governance of the MRC. In the terminology of our paper, the governance of the Mekong River
Commission is an example of an exogenous factor λ whose impact on the political process we want
to assess. It is a somewhat unique exogenous factor in that changes in governance would map
to changing the political prediction concept W(z, λ). Under weak governance, individual policies
and extractions would be viable as long as they provided positive net benefits for the country or
countries constructing each individual dam and extracting given water amounts. Under strong
governance, policies would only be viable if all dams and extractions within the MRC collectively
provided positive net benefits for the MRC as a whole.
As in the Delta example, the impact of changing the strength of the MRC’s governance will depend
on exactly how the stakeholders in the region weight different objectives. In particular, the param-
eter vector z would include the weight each country places on the concerns of different stakeholder
groups within its borders. Moreover, both Houba et al. (2013) and Pham Do and Dinar (2014) dis-
cuss the role that uncertainty about impacts might have on stakeholders. If the underlying model
were extended to include uncertainty, the level of risk aversion of the different countries would be
included in the parameter vector z. Applying our approach would yield robust predictions about
how the set of possibly viable policy outcomes would change if the governance of the Mekong River
Commission were strengthened.
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5.2. Upper Guadiana Basin in Spain. Rapid expansion of groundwater fed irrigation in the
Upper Guadiana Basin in Spain has led to dramatic drops in water levels throughout the region.
Despite legal restrictions on the amount of drilling and pumping, many farmers throughout the
region rely on illegal wells to irrigate their farms. Falling water levels threaten the survival of an
important wetlands containing a national park. Marchiori et al. (2012) develop a game theoretic
model of local negotiations between environmentalists and several different groups of farmers, dis-
tinguished by size and water rights, over policies to address reduce water use and illegal pumping.
They conclude that strong government action in the form of increased enforcement of existing
policies will be required to save the wetlands and provide numerical estimates of the size of fines
consistent with stabilization of water levels.
Our methodology could be used to provide a more robust answer to a somewhat broader question:
how does the likelihood of meeting a water level target vary with enforcement efforts? In the
language of our model, λ would be a measure of enforcement severity. Since Marchiori et al. (2012)
model local negotiations using Nash bargaining, the Pareto dominance prediction criteria used
in our application in this paper would remain appropriate. We would measure the likelihood of
meeting the target by looking at the fraction of the policies in the Pareto dominant set for which
water levels meet or exceed the target level. Finally, the parameter vector z could include all the
parameters in the various stakeholders utility functions and many of the parameters describing how
both farmers and water levels respond to various actions.
5.3. Jucar Basin in Spain. Kahil et al. (2016) use cooperative game theory to model negotiations
over water policies in the Jucar Basin in Spain. They conclude that cooperation among water users
reduces the negative impact of droughts but also find that government action will likely be required
to protect ecosystems in cases of severe drought.
Our approach could be used to ask how likely it is that ecosystem flows will meet a specified target
or to the look at the distribution of plausible flow results, while explicitly recognizing considerable
uncertainty about model parameters and the political situation. Since the authors’ emphasis was
on the role of government action to protect ecosystems, λ would be a measure of the stringency
of government protections for ecosystems. The uncertain parameter vector z would include the
parameters governing the different users’ payoff functions.
29
The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000067
While Pareto dominance would be a reasonable prediction concept, we could also apply a some-
what stronger criterion. In their analysis, Kahil et al. (2016) compare the predictions of several
cooperative models but also emphasize that only solutions belonging to the Core of the cooperative
game are stable, since there is a coalition that would block any other solution. This observation
suggests using the Core as the political prediction concept. We could then ask either how likely
it is that a particular flow level is part of the Core or how the likelihood of meeting a particular
target varies across plausible parameterizations. Finally, we would vary the stringency parameter
λ and look at how the answers to these questions change.
5.4. Adour River Basin. Under the national French water law passed in 1992, stakeholders were
required to negotiate rules for implementing water development plans at the catchment level. In
the upper Adour River basin, this required negotiation over water quotas and quota prices for three
groups of farmers, as well as whether or not one or more of three potential dams would be built.
Simon et al. (2007) develop a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining model of this negotiation
process utilizing the theoretical framework developed in Rausser and Simon (1999). Each player is
a representative member of some stakeholder class. The classes are: the three groups of farmers,
whose utilities depend on their quotas and prices for quotas; an environmentalist, who is concerned
with both downstream water flows and the negative effects of dams on the landscape; a downstream
user concerned strictly with flows; a water system manager responsible for balancing the budget of
the water system, who prefers to administer a larger system; and a taxpayer who is concerned with
the capital cost of dams.
One of the questions examined by the authors was whether or not a common negotiator (“spokesman”)
for the three farmers can improve the utilities they obtain in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The
spokesman’s objective was to maximize the average utility of the three farmers. Under this as-
sumption, average farmer welfare generally was higher with a spokesman. Two factors drove this
result: first, when he proposed a solution in the negotiation process, each individual farmer would
allocate himself a large quota at a low price and charge other farmers high prices for small quotas
to meet the system’s operating costs; while this “beggar-thy-neighbor” behavior was individually
rational, it was collectively self-defeating; the spokesman, by “internalizing the negative external-
ities” that individual farmers were imposing on each other, could negotiate a better outcome for
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farmers collectively; second, the spokesman rationalized prices and quotas across the three farmers
in order to equate marginal returns to water quotas. However, the increase in average farmer payoff
came at the expense of at least one farmer, suggesting that side payments would be necessary in
order for the farmers to be willing to negotiate as one using a spokesman.
Our approach could be used to evaluate the robustness of this finding to the parameters of the
environmentalist’s utility function and to the weights the spokesman assigns to the utilities of
the three farmer groups. To do this, our exogenous factor λ would determine whether farmers
participate individually or are represented by a spokesperson. Since Pareto dominance is a necessary
condition for a policy to be a solution of the Rausser-Simon model, it is the natural political
prediction concept to use in our analysis. In Simon et al. (2007), the spokesman’s weights are
equal. In practice, it may be more appropriate for the spokesman to assign different weights,
depending on, say, relative group size or political power. By including the weights in our parameter
vector z, we could investigate how changing the weights would change the set of side-payments
that would be required, in order for for all farmers to be willing to delegate negotiating power to
a spokesman.
One would also expect the outcome variables to differ, depending on the parameters determining
the relative importance of downstream flows and rural landscapes in the environmentalist’s utility
function. The more important downstream flows are relative to rural landscapes for the environ-
mentalist, the more dam storage capacity will be built. The resulting increase in the supply of
water will be allocated across multiple uses, not just downstream flows. In turn, the allocation will
depend in part on how the spokesman weights the utilities of the three farmers.
Both the parameters in the environmentalist’s utility function and the weights the spokesman places
on the utilities of the three farmers are unlikely to be known to the modeler, so using our approach to
evaluate the sensitivity of the results to these three parameters would enable identification of the set
of possible outcomes when there is a spokesman. This set could be compared to the set of possible
outcomes when the three farmers act independently in the negotiations. Potentially,differences
in the set of potential outcomes with and without a spokesman could induce the government to
specify which groups are permitted (or required) to negotiate independently. In other words, the
31
The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000067
government could evaluate the set of possible outcomes when deciding which stakeholders have a
seat at the negotiating table.
5.5. Piave River Basin. Sgobbi and Carraro (2007) also utilize the Rausser and Simon (1999)
non-cooperative bargaining model to develop a multi-player model of bargaining over summer and
winter water allocations in the Piave River basin when water supplies are uncertain. Players in-
clude two regional institutions representing farmers, an upstream province interested in maintaining
tourism dependent on lakes and reservoirs, a hydroelectric power company, and downstream munic-
ipalities which value river flows. The authors conduct single-variable comparative statics exercises.
The two most interesting to consider using our approach are redistributing access between the
two players representing farmers’ interests, and varying the subjective belief of one player, the
hydroelectric power company, regarding summer water resources.
As in the previous example, our approach could be used to evaluate the sensitivity of the set of
possible solutions variations in players’ access probabilities. In addition, Sgobbi and Carraro (2007)
assume that the parameters governing the uncertainty of water supplies are exogenously specified.
Our approach could investigate the effect on the set of feasible solutions of varying these parameters.
The authors calibrate their utility functions using input from the stakeholders themselves, which
suggests using either a tighter interval for the parameter space than was plausible in our other
applications and/or a non-uniform distribution function f(z). At the same time, as the authors
acknowledge, the conclusions of the model are still sensitive to these parameters and our approach
would assess how confident we can be of the impact of changes in a player’s beliefs, given that some
parameters are uncertain.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach to predictive political economy in the presence of sub-
stantial uncertainty about model parameterization. We then applied it to California’s Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta in a detailed case study and discussed several other water and ecosystem man-
agement negotiations where it could be used.
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Our Delta case study analysis suggests that it is extremely unlikely that several highly publicized
policies will emerge as solutions, because they fail to Pareto dominate the default outcome. Because
our approach considers a wide range of parameterizations for each stakeholder’s utility functions,
this conclusion is much stronger than it could be with only a single parameterization, even if
we conducted sensitivity analysis on each element of that parameterization in turn. There is an
important caveat to this conclusion: because our analysis focused on export policy alone, it does
not rule out the possibility that policies we identify as non-viable could be coupled with additional
policy changes outside our policy space to craft a compromise policy. Such efforts have been made
in the Delta debate. For instance, earlier plans called to couple the construction of canals with
substantial expenditures on habitat that are not considered in our analysis. Moreover, like Madani
and Lund (2011), we abstract away from the possibility of monetary transfers between stakeholder
groups.
In the case study we also find that there are policies that Pareto dominate the default. Strikingly,
all such policies involve dual conveyance. Except under perfect trust, none of these policies meet our
strong RPV standard. However, there is a large set that satisfy our Pareto dominance criterion for
more than 40% of the parameterizations we consider, even with substantial mistrust of institutions.
Our result is consistent with public opinion polls finding that Californians consider drought and
water supplies a critical problem for the state, regardless of whether the respondents support (in
a survey by Californians for Water Security Herdt (2014)) or oppose (in a survey by the Natural
Resources Defense Council Herdt (2015)) investing in north-south water conveyance. We infer from
these polls that while there is wide support for investment in some solution to California’s water
problems, it is unlikely that sufficient public support could be generated for a solution involving a
single method for North-South conveyance. This suggests that evaluating the potential performance
of a wide variety of dual conveyance options would facilitate future negotiations.
Mistrust of other stakeholders is a feature of many negotiations involving water and ecosystem
management. In our case study, the impact of mistrust on the prospects for agreement is highly
dependent on the precise parameters of the stakeholders’ utility functions. It is thus hard to make
robust predictions about the impact that institutional changes might have on the debate. When
we looked at the most natural individual parameterization of the model, comparative statics on
the impact of mistrust gave us surprising results. We found that there were more potentially viable
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policies because a belief that they might be able to use political pressure to increase their export
allotments in the future increased the utility of water users more than the risk of higher exports
hurt environmentalists. When we looked across specifications, we found a more nuanced story
about mistrust. Mistrust increases the probability that there are no win-win policies, a conclusion
that corresponds with our intuition. At the same time, mistrust decreases our ability to predict
the number of win-win policies or the average level of exports flowing through the tunnel. If being
confident in the prediction of policies that PD the default is important, there are therefore two
ways to improve predictions: learn more about stakeholders’ utility or reduce mistrust.
One particularly useful aspects of our model is that it suggests a shift in perspective. As we note
on p. 8, our paper complements other approaches in the sense that while most analyses ask a
positive question, we ask a negative one. Specifically, each of the game theoretic papers we discuss
in this papers specifies one or more solution concepts, and then asks “what outcome(s) satisfies
our solution concept(s)?” On the other hand, one of the questions that we ask in our paper is:
“what outcomes cannot be a solution to the problem, for a wide set of game-theoretic solution
concepts, and for (almost) any possible parameterization of the problem?” Our approach thus can
be viewed as a practical first step for negotiating an agreement. We find intuitive support for this in
approaches to negotiations discussed in the popular business literature. Finding common ground,
or “getting to yes,” is sometimes presented as the basis for successful negotiations (Fisher et al.;
2011). Our approach aids in eliminating options which are highly unlikely to be acceptable to all
stakeholders.
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Technical Appendix
Modeling Negotiations over Water and Ecosystem Management:
Uncertainty and Political Viability
This technical appendix provides additional detail on both our general framework and the specifics
of the Delta application. We begin by presenting the general model using set theory and then
present the specifics of the Delta application.
A.1. Probabilistic Political Viability
The approach begins with a predictive political economic model that has four basic components:
a set of policy options; a set of stakeholders or participants in the process; a political prediction
mapping from policy options via outcomes to stakeholder expected utilities; and a prediction con-
cept. The prediction concept selects policy options that meet a certain political viability criterion,
based on the expected utilities that stakeholders assign to these options.
A.1.1. Exogenous variables. Each exogenous variable in our model is classified either as a param-
eter, a state-dependent variable or a policy. The term parameter refers to any exogenous variable
whose value is known by stakeholders. We denote by Z the space of all parameter vectors, with
generic element z. Our notation here diverges slightly from the main text. There we separately
defined λ and z although λ meets the formal definition of z provided here.
The set of possible states of the world is given by S ⊂ R, with generic element s. For every model
variable classified as state dependent, we specify a probability distribution f (s; z) over the states
of the world that represent stakeholders’ uncertainty about it. 20 The parameters governing these
distributions are included in z. Conventionally, a state of the world refers to a “move by nature”
(Rasmusen; 2007, p.54). Here we use the term state of the world very broadly to encompass
any component of the model about which stakeholders are uncertain, including ones that are not
usually thought of as being determined by nature, such as certain random aspects of the mapping
from policies to outcomes and the default outcomes. Stakeholders face unpredictability in the
traditional sense, i.e., Knightian risk: they know the probability distributions over which they
must take expectations. In reality, however, there is no bright line distinction between Knightian
risk and uncertainty. Rather, these concepts should be thought of as extreme points of a conceptual
continuum, along which our stakeholders’ unknowns are dispersed. f (s; z) over the states of the
world that represent stakeholders’ uncertainty about it.
Finally, there is a policy space X ⊂ R2, with generic element x, consisting of a set of possible policy
options.
A.1.2. A Political Prediction Mapping. Stakeholders derive expected utilities not from a par-
ticular policy per se, but from the range of possible outcomes that might be induced if this policy
were implemented. We thus define a mapping from Z× S× X to the outcome space Y ⊂ Rm.
An element y ∈ Y is called an outcome vector, and the components of y will be referred to simply
as outcomes. The specification of this mapping depends on the parameter vector z so the outcome
20 Although stakeholders are uncertain about model variables, they know the distributions of these variables. See Vercammen
et al. (1990) for a political economy analysis in which stakeholders have incorrect beliefs.
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of policy x conditional on state of the world s and outcome parameter vector zy is denoted by
y (x, s, z).
Each participant in the political process has a utility function defined over outcomes that is also
dependent on the parameter vector. The vector u (y (x, s, z) , z) enumerates the utilities of all
stakeholders resulting from policy in state s given z. Stakeholders maximize expected utility,
taking expectations over possible states of the world. The vector of stakeholders’ expected utilities
is
Eu (x, z) =
w
u (y (x, s, z) , z) f (s, z) ds. (A.1)
A predictive political economic model is represented by a political prediction mappingW : Z→ X.
Given a parameterization z ∈ Z of the model, W(z) is the model’s prediction of which element (or
elements) from X are politically viable, in a sense to be described below.
The specification of W(·) is specific to the application being considered. In many cases, including
the applications discussed in the paper, it will identify the set of policies meeting some threshold
utility level for the individual stakeholders. As an example, we formalize the definition of the Pareto
dominance political prediction criterion.
Given a “default outcome” that will be implemented if the participants in the political process
cannot negotiate an agreement, W(z) is the set of alternatives that Pareto dominate this out-
come when the model is parameterized by z. Let yd (s, z) denote the default outcome. The
dependence of yd on s reflects the possibility that stakeholders may be uncertain about what
will happen in the absence of an agreement. Moreover, z will in general influence default out-
comes and utilities in addition to negotiated outcomes. The vector of expected default utilities
is: Eud (z) =
r
u
(
yd (s, z) , z
)
f (s, z) ds. Note that by definition this vector is independent of
every non-default policy x in X. The Pareto dominance political prediction mapping is specified
as: W(z) =
{
x ∈ X : Eui (x, z) ≥ Eu
d
i (z) for all i
}
.
A.1.3. Probabilistic Political Viability. While stakeholders know the value of z, the modeler
does not. To incorporate this lack of knowledge into our approach, we model the components of z
as stochastic; we define a random vector z˜ ∈ Z with density function f(z˜), representing epistemic
uncertainty about the true value of z. Given this definition of parameters, constants, which are
known to the modeler as well as the stakeholders, are included as elements of z with a degenerate
distribution.
We first study the role of modeling uncertainty through the use of a probabilistic policy viability
function V : X → [0, 1] , where V (x) is the probability computed over possible realizations of
modeling uncertainty that policy x satisfies our viability criterion, i.e., Pareto dominates the default.
Formally, V (x) = PrZ (x ∈W (z)). This function is a measure of our model’s assessment of the
political viability of the policy vector x. It has no closed form solution, but can be evaluated
numerically for any particular policy.
To facilitate interpretation of our results, we partition the policy space into “more likely” and
“less likely” regions to summarize the information provided by our viability function. Formally,
for some K, we specify a K -vector ρ of probability threshholds, where 0 = ρ1 < ρk < ρK < 1,
and, for each k, define a “more likely” region C+k = {x ∈ X : V (x) > ρk} and a “less likely” region
C
−
k = {x ∈ X : V (x) ≤ ρk} . C
+
k and C
−
k are, respectively, the upper- and lower-contour sets of V
corresponding to ρk. C
+
k contains all policies that Pareto dominate the default for some fraction
2
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exceeding ρk of possible realizations of modeling uncertainty. We will say that a policy in the
“highest” upper-contour set C+k is robustly politically viable; for a policy with this designation, we
can have a high degree of confidence that its political viability is not highly sensitive to specific
model parameterizations. Conversely, a policy in the “lowest” lower-contour set C−1 will be called
never politically viable; we can be highly confident that a policy in this category will not survive
the political process, regardless of specific model parameterizations.
We also consider how descriptions of the individual viable sets vary across the distribution of z. Let
Mj(W(z)) be a summary statistic about the set. Such statistics could include the size of the set,
its expected value along some dimension of the policy space X or other measures of its dispersion
or shape. The numerical solution procedure described in the previous set allows us to look at the
distribution of these summary statistics induced by the distribution of possible parameter vectors.
This distribution is given by
hM (Mj , f(z˜)) =
w
Z
Mj(W(z))f(z˜)dz.
A.1.4. Simulation Approach. Susan: It felt out of order to me so I rewrote it fairly
substantially. How does this sound? For complex policy problems it is virtually impossible to
express in tractable analytical form the key elements of the predictive political model, in particular,
y (·) , W(·) and V(·). Instead, the model is analyzed using simulation techniques. First, specific
functional forms are assigned to y (·) and u (·). We then specify the set of possible parameter
vectors Z and the set of possible states of the world S. We also specify distributions over Z and
S. The distribution over S can depend on the specific realization of z˜ since we may have modeling
uncertainty over stakeholder’s beliefs about the distribution of future states.
In our Delta application, we define the parameter space Z as a hypercube and assume that the
elements of the random parameter vector z˜ are independently and uniformly distributed, but our
methodology can incorporate alternate specifications of Z and f(z˜). For each realization of z˜, the
distribution over states of the world has density h(·; z˜). Again, in our application, we assume that
h(·; z) is a constant over the relevant support but alternate specifications are possible.
Once the model is specified, we use a nested loop to generate our results. For each z ∈ Z (the
“outer loop”), we compute players’ payoffs for each policy in X and for the default outcome for
each realization s ∈ S (the “inner loop”). We then take expectations over S and identify W(z).
This approach provides a comprehensive picture of political viability across the entire spectrum
of plausible parameter configurations through the probabilistic viability function V (·), its associ-
ated upper and lower contour sets C+k and C
−
k , and the distributions of our summary statistics
hM (Mj , f(z˜)).
A.2. Delta Application Details
While the discussion in the main text used the policy x as an argument for ease of exposition,
the outcomes of policy choices depend on actual export regimes, not simply the chosen policy, for
reasons detailed later in this appendix. The actual export regime, g (x), is described in subsection
A.2.3 below. Because outcomes depend on g, we have defined each of the functions below using g
as our argument rather than x.
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A.2.1. Flow Variables. Three flow variables are derived from the policy variables: the amount of
water flowing into the Delta (χin), the amount of water exported through the Delta (χδ), and the
amount of water exported through the twin tunnels (χpc). To calculate the Delta inflow, we specify
the current inflow from the Sacramento River into the Delta using a constant (χin0). Because the
tunnel intakes would be upstream of the Delta, water that is exported through the tunnels would
not flow into the Delta while water that is exported through the Delta would. Thus,
χδ = gex (1− gshr)
χpc = gex · gshr
χin = χsac − χpc.
A.2.2. Fish Survival Probabilities. For each fish species, we define a random variable sfi that
takes on the value 1 if the species survives and 0 if it does not. Using information from Lund et al.
(2008), we calibrate two fish survival probability functions: one for smelt and one for salmon. We
assume these functions have the form:
p¯ii (g) = ai + biχ
αin
in + ciχ
αδ
δ + diχ
αpc
pc
where the exponents αi are elements of scientific uncertainty and are allowed to vary across terms.
The precise values of the parameters ai, bi, ci, and di are part of the state of the world; their
values in a particular state of the world are generated in a two-step procedure. The four policies
considered in Lund et al. (2008) correspond to four different values for the vector g, expressed
together in matrix form as G. In the first step, for each state of the world we draw a vector fˆpi
of survival probabilities whose individual elements are the survival probabilities for each of these
policies. In the second step, we compute the values of ai, bi, ci, and di that set pii (G) = fˆpi) for
each of the four policies considered by Lund et al. (2008). The probabilities represent stakeholders’
a priori beliefs about the distribution of sfi .
A.2.3. Actual Export Regime. As noted above, there is a divergence between the declared
export policy x and the actual export regime g. The function g (x; s, zy) gives the actual export
regime. There are three distinct reasons that the actual regime may vary from the declared policy.
We consider each in turn and define intermediate mappings incorporating their impacts.
Mistrust. As described in the main text, λ is the probability that exports are increased to a maxi-
mum feasible level (given by the constant χmax). This implies that prior to any disaster or ecosystem
related changes in exports, the actual level of exports is given by (1− λ)xex+λχmax and the actual
share through the tunnels is given by (1− λ)xshr + λ
(
1− χδ
χmax
)
. We denote the resulting vector
gM (x;λ), with the M indicating an adjustment for mistrust.
Ecosystem Driven Cutbacks. The possibility that managers may alter the export policy after ob-
serving a signal about fish survival based on legal requirements, environmental regulations, or other
factors creates a divergence between the declared policy and the actual export level. We assume
that this decision occurs after any change in exports due to mistrust has occurred. Therefore, there
is a function gE (x; s, zy) that maps a declared policy vector x into an export regime after the
impacts of both mistrust and ecosystem driven cutbacks are realized.
Decisions about whether to require cutbacks (set gE 6= gM ) must occur prior to nature determining
whether the fish species survive (i.e. before nature selects a value of sfi ). Before making a decision,
4
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managers observe a signal that allows them to update their prior belief about the distribution of
s
f
i . The realization of this signal ωi for each species is an element of the state of the world. This
variable takes on the values {good, bad} where good implies that managers have received positive
news about fish populations leading them to believe the probability of survival is now higher than
p¯ii and bad implies that managers have received negative information about fish populations leading
them to believe the probability of survival is now lower than p¯ii. Formally, the managers’ updated
probability distribution for sfi is defined as pˆii
pˆii
(
gE , ωi
)
=
{
ηi + (1− ηi) p¯ii
(
gE
)
if ωi = good
(1− ηi) p¯ii
(
gE
)
if ωi = bad
(A.2)
where ηi ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the information content of the signal. Note that if ηi = 1, the
signal perfectly predicts survival and if ηi = 0, the signal provides no added information relative to
the prior. For simplicity, the distribution of ωi conditional on declared policy x is
ωi
(
gM
)
=
{
good with probability p¯ii
(
gM
)
bad with probability 1− p¯ii
(
gM
)
.
(A.3)
The formulation embodied in Equations (A.2) and (A.3) guarantees that if managers decide not
change the policy in response to the signal, the initial prior and the expected fish survival after
observing the signal remain consistent:
p¯ii
(
gM
)
= Pr
(
ωi
(
gM
)
= good
)
pˆii
(
gM , good
)
+ Pr
(
ωi
(
gM
)
= bad
)
pˆii
(
gM , bad
)
.
Note that the signals are a function of gM while the ultimate survival probabilities are a function of
gE . Because there is (and has been in the past) considerable uncertainty about whether managers
will in fact reduce exports after observing a bad signal, we introduce another random variable R
that takes on the value 1 if the cutbacks occur following the observation of at least one bad signal
and 0 otherwise. The distribution of R is given by the variable ν, which gives the probability
that R = 1. If cutbacks occur, managers reduce exports of all types by a constant proportion µ.
Therefore,
gE (x, ω,R) =
{
µgM (x;λ) if R = 1 and ωi
(
gM
)
= bad for some i
gM (x;λ) otherwise (i.e. if R = 0 or ωi
(
gM
)
= good for all i).
Post-Collapse Exports. The final source of variation between the declared policy and the actual
export regime has a different character. Based on scientific consensus, the key question regarding
the probability of major levee collapse is when a collapse will occur, not whether one will occur. The
random variable τ is the year in which a collapse occurs. We adopt the Lund et al. (2008) hypothesis
that there is a constant annual probability of major levee collapse (pannFail). This probability is
calculated from a cummulative probability of failure over Y rs years given by pfail according to the
formula
pannFail = 1− (1− pfail)
1
Y rs .
Stakeholders receive a stream of annual pre-collapse utilities and a stream of annual post-collapse
utilities discounted to the present using the interest rate r.
We assume that all exports will be shifted to the twin tunnels following a major levee collapse, if
they exist. If they have not been built, the state can either build one after the disaster or repair
the Delta levees and continue pumping through the Delta exclusively.21 The decision of whether to
21 A third option would be to cease exports in the wake of a major levee collapse. According to Lund et al. (2008) such an
outcome is unlikely because it would likely cost the state more than constructing an isolated conveyance structure would.
We have no information that contradicts this statement.
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build tunnels or repair as an element of the future state of the world is represented by the random
variable ξ whose distribution is governed by pξ, the probability that the tunnels are built following
a major levee collapse.
This structure implies that the export regime after a disaster is
gad (x; s, zy) =


(
gEex
1
)
if xshr ¿ 0 or ξ = 1
gE if xshr = 0 and ξ = 0.
The export regime before a disaster is simply
gbd (x; s, zy) = gE (x; s, zy) .
A.2.4. Agricultural Employment. The level of agricultural employment in the San Joaquin
Valley depends on total water exports:
yemploy (g) = ε0 + ε1
gex
χ0
where ε0 is the number of agricultural jobs in the San Joaquin Valley with no exports and ε1 is the
increase in the number of jobs with pre-2007 export levels.
A.2.5. Costs.
Reduced water exports. Lund et al. (2008) provide estimates of the total costs to the state of reducing
exports from pre-2007 levels to three levels: no exports, 25% of pre-2007 levels, and 50% of pre-
2007 levels. Their detailed results in Appendix J separate these costs into specific regions which
correspond roughly to urban and agricultural water users. We use that information to calibrate
two functions of the form:
Crxk (g) = C
nx
k e
ϑrxk
gex
χ0
where Cnxk is the cost to the water user group of no exports and ϑ
rx
k is the calibrated parameter.
Water treatment. Water exported through the Delta must be treated due to its high salinity. The
total treatment cost is proportional to the amount of water flowing through the Delta:
Ctreat (g) = Ctreat0
χδ (g)
χ0
where χ0 is the pre-2007 level of exports (all of which flow through the Delta) and C
treat
0 is the
Lund et al. (2008) treatment cost estimate for that export level.
The water treatment costs are split between agricultural and urban water users in rough proportion
to the amount of water they use. The share of total exports used by agricultural users increases
with total exports, so the share of treatment costs paid by Ag is
ζtreatAg = ζˆ
treat
Ag
(
gex
χ0
)ϑAgtreat
and the share of treatment costs paid by Ur is
ζtreatUr =
(
1− ζtreatAg
)
.
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Construction costs. Because the assumed size of the twin tunnels is independent of the planned
level of exports (based on engineering considerations), the annualized cost of construction is
Cconstruct =
{
rCconstruct0 if χpc>0
0 otherwise.
Cconstruct0 is the Lund et al. (2008) estimate of the total cost of constructing an isolated conveyance
structure. These costs are allocated among Ag, Ur, and Tp according to the share vector ζtreat.
Levee maintenance. The cost of maintaining the levees is
Cmntn = Cmntn0
(
χδ
χ0
)ϑmntn
where Cmntn0 is the estimate in Lund et al. (2008) of maintenance costs with pre-2007 exports all
flowing through the Delta.
Major collapse of the levee system. The cost of a major collapse is
Ccollapse =
{
0 if t < τ
rC
collapse
0 if t ≥ τ and gshr = 0.
These collapse costs consider only the costs that could be avoided if exports were instead routed
through tunnels. Any costs of collapse that are unaffected by the export regime (e.g. ecosystem
impacts or the inundation of Delta islands) are constant throughout the policy space and thus
excluded.
Repair following a major collapse. The cost of repairing after a major collapse depends on whether
twin tunnels are built or the levees are repaired and through-Delta exports continue. The repair
cost is thus
Crepair (g) =


0 if t < τ or gshr > 0
rC
repair
0 if t ≥ τ , gshr = 0, and ξ = 0
rCconstruct0 if t ≥ τ , gshr = 0, and ξ = 1.
Stakeholder net benefits. Three stakeholders (Ag, Ur, and Tp) pay all of the costs in the model.
Their net financial benefits are
Bk = B
0
k − C
rx
k −
∑
c
ζckC
c
where c = {treat, construct,mntn, collapse, repair}.
A.2.6. Stakeholder Utility.
Taxpayers. Taxpayers are risk neutral and have utility of the form
uu(Tp) (g) = BTp (g) .
This utility function is not subject to modeling uncertainty apart from any effects on g.
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Urban users. Urban water users are only concerned about the cost of meeting their water supply
needs and are risk averse, giving them a utility function of
uu(Ur) (g) = (BUr (g))
γUr
where BUr is the benefit, net of all water supply costs, and the level of risk aversion (γ
Ur) is part
of modeling uncertainty.
Agricultural users. Agricultural interests value both agricultural employment (yemploy)and their
benefits net of all the costs they pay (BAg). They have CES utility given by
uu(Ag) (g) =
[
wemployyemploy (g)
eSubExpAg +
(
1− wemploy
)
BAg (g)
eSubExpAg
] γAg
eSubExpAg
where eSubExp = eSub−1
eSub
governs the elasticity of substitution, wemploy is their weighting parameter,
and γAg is their degree of risk aversion. Each of these parameters is part of modeling uncertainty.
In-Delta interests. In-Delta interests are concerned with maintenance expenditures (Cmntn) and
Delta water quality, proxied by Delta inflow, χin. They have a CES utility function. To avoid
problems when one of their utility arguments is equal to zero, we add a constant qmntnto the
maintenance expenditures before calculating utility. Their utility function is
uu(Dt) (g) =
[
wmntn
(
Cmntn (g) + qmntn
)
eSubExpDt +
(
1− wmntn
)
χin (g)
eSubExpDt
] γDt
eSubExpDt
eSubExp = eSub−1
eSub
governs the elasticity of substitution, wmntn is their weighting parameter, and γDt
is their degree of risk aversion. Each of these parameters is part of modeling uncertainty, as is the
constant qmntn.
Environmentalists. Environmentalists are concerned only with the survival of two fish species:
Delta smelt and salmon. Utility is defined in terms of these species’ survivals as four state-dependent
utility levels. If both species survive, utility is 1 and if neither survives utility is 0. If only one
species survive utility takes an intermediate value. Expected utility increases as the probability of
survival increases for each species.
uu(Ev) (g) =


vEvboth if pˆii (g) = 1 for i = {smelt, salmon}
vEvsalmon if pˆisalmon (g) = 1 and pˆismelt (g) = 0
vEvsmelt if pˆismelt (g) = 1 and pˆisalmon (g) = 0
vEvnone if pˆii (g) = 0 for i = {smelt, salmon}
Discounted utility streams. As discussed in subsection A.3, stakeholders experience one stream of
utility prior to a major collapse and a second stream following a major levee collapse. Thus, their
utility conditional on the state of the world is
uk (y (x; s, z
y) ; zu)
=
uk
(
ybd (x; s, zy) ; zu
)
r
−
uk
(
ybd (x; s, zy) ; zu
)
− uk
(
yad (x; s, zy) ; zu
)
r
(
pannFail (1 + r)
pannFail + r
)
.
This expression results from integrating over the distribution of time to failure implied by the
annual hazard rate pannFail.
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Discontinuities. There is a discontinuity in the mapping from policies to expected utilities when
xshr = 0 because the costs and benefits of tunnels change discontinuously. We assume that if
tunnels exist all exports will be routed through them in the event of catastrophic damage to Delta
levees. This reflects an important discontinuity in the real-world political-economic landscape: if an
isolated conveyance is built, it will have a very high option value, even if xshr ≈ 0. The discontinuity
is particularly important for Tp and Ev. In the absence of an alternative conveyance option, a major
levee collapse will lead to one of two outcomes: either the tunnels will be built or extensive levee
repairs will be undertaken. Either would occur on an emergency basis, with a compressed schedule
and the associated increased costs. The high cost of these emergency response options implies that
the maximum xex (and thus the maximum regular levee maintenance expenditures) that Tp will
accept falls when xshr = 0. The possibility of rebuilding the Delta levees and continuing through
Delta exports also creates a discontinuity for Ev: For any given xex, fish survival probabilities are
lowest when the realized share conveyed through the tunnels is zero. In short, even if tunnels would
be used only in the event of a disaster, in expectation their existence would contribute significantly
to fish survival probabilities. For this reason, the maximum level of xex that Evwill accept falls
discontinuously when xshr = 0.
A.2.7. Default. The level of default exports is influenced by modeling uncertainty and the realized
future state of the world. The variable xdex gives the maximum level of total exports in the default.
We introduce a state-contingent random variable φ that is distributed uniformly on the interval
(0, 1). The maximum level of default exports is given by
xdex = φ
(
xdex + υdx
)
+ (1− φ)
(
xdex − υdx
)
where φ is state-contingent, xdex is a constant and υdx is an element of modeling uncertainty. This
formulation implies that xdex is distributed uniformly across an interval centered on x
d
ex whose width
varies with modeling uncertainty.
The actual default export regime is state contingent because non-zero probabilities of additional
ecosystem-driven cutbacks and future levee failures exist. The variable Rd indicates whether ecosys-
tem cutbacks occur in the default; the probability that Rd = 1 is ν0, which is set equal to 1 in
our simulations as shown in Table A.3. This implies that default exports after uncertainty about
ecosystem cutbacks is resolved are
gE
d
(
xd, ω,Rd
)
=
{
µxd if Rd = 1 and ωi
(
xd
)
= bad for some i
xd if Rd = 0 or ωi
(
xd
)
= good for all i.
There are only two differences between the mapping from the actual default export regime to payoff-
relevant outcomes and the mapping from the actual export regime induced by an agreement. First,
in the default Cmntn
(
gd
)
= 0 regardless of the level of default exports. Second, if tunnels are
constructed following a major levee collapse in the default, they will be more expensive to build
due to the need to move on an accelerated schedule in the absence of any framework for doing
so (and, perhaps, pre-existing enmity between the stakeholders). This consequence is captured by
specifying that the construction cost in the default is (1 + Pd)C
construct
(
gd
)
.
The existence or extent of mistrust has no impact on default exports because the twin tunnels will
not be built in the default, so xdshr = 0.
A.2.8. Model Coefficients. The model coefficients that are elements of modeling uncertainty are
described in Table 2 in the main text. Table A.1 replicates this information, adding an initial
9
The final publication is available from now publishers via http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000067
Table A.1. Elements of modeling uncertainty
Variable Lower Bound Upper Bound
wemploy Weight on jobs vs money in Ag utility 0.2 0.8
wmntn Weight on maintenance vs inflows in Dt utility 0.2 0.8
qmntn Constant in Dt utility 0.05 0.15
eSubAg Ag elasticity of substiution 0.5 1.5
eSubDt Dt elasticity of substitution 0.5 1.5
γAg Ag risk aversion coefficient 0.2 1
γDt Dt risk aversion coefficient 0.2 1
γUr Ur risk aversion coefficient 0.2 1
vEvsmelt Ev utility if only smelt survive
∗ 0.25 0.75
vEvsalmon Ev utility if only salmon survive
∗ 0.25 0.75
υdx Spread of default export distribution above and below mean (maf) 0 2
∗ Ev utility is scaled so that 0 represents the utility if neither species survives and 1 represents the utility if
both survive.
column identifying the mathematical symbol used for these coefficients in this appendix. These
variables are independently and uniformly distributed on their specified intervals.
Table A.2 lists the primitive variables governing uncertainty about the future state of the world.
Again, the variables are assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed on the given
intervals. Many of these upper and lower bounds are drawn directly from Lund et al. (2008); the
source of these is listed as PPIC in Table A.2 .
The functions presented above rely on several variables that are treated as constants. These vari-
ables and their sources are listed in Table A.3.
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Table A.2. State dependent variables and their distributions
Symbol Variable Lower Bound Upper Bound Source
piSmeltPC Smelt surival prob with x = (6, 1) .1 .4 PPIC
piSalmonPC Salmon survival prob with x = (6, 1) .2 .5 PPIC
piSmeltDual Smelt survival prob with x = (6, 0.5) .1 .4 PPIC+assumption
piSalmonDual Salmon survival prob with x = (6, 0.5) .2 .5 PPIC+assumption
piSmeltThru Smelt survival prob with x = (6, 0) .05 .3 PPIC
piSalmonThru Salmon survival prob with x = (6, 0) .1 .3 PPIC
piSmeltNo Smelt survival prob with x = (0, ·) .3 .6 PPIC
piSalmonNo Salmon survival prob with x = (0, ·) .4 .8 PPIC
ζ
collapse
Tp Tp share of collapse costs .2 1 Assumption
ζ
repair
Tp Tp share of maintenance costs .5 1 Assumption/SU
ϑmntn Exponent in maintenance cost function 0.5 1.5 Assumption
ϑrepair Exponent in repair cost function .1 .2 Assumption
C
collapse
0
Total cost of collapse ($ billion) 7.8 15.7 PPIC
C
repair
0
Total cost of repairs ($ billion) .2 2.5 PPIC
Cconstruct0 Total cost of isolated conveyance construction ($ billion) 4.75 9.75 PPIC
Ctreat0 Annualized treatment cost for χδ = 6 ($ billion/yr) .3 1 PPIC
ϑrxAg Exponent in Ag scarcity cost function -3.62 -1.58 Derived from PPIC
ϑrxUr Exponent in Ur scarcity cost function -6.35 -1.97 Derived from PPIC
µ Export reduction share if fish don’t recover .25 .4 PPIC
pfail Cummulative failure probability over Yrs .34 .95 PPIC
CnxAg Scarcity cost to ag with no exports ($ billion/yr) .49 .96 Derived from PPIC
CnxUr Scarcity cost to ur with no exports ($ billion/yr) 1.1 1.54 Derived from PPIC
Cmntn0 Maintenance costs for x = (6, 0) ($ billion/yr) 1 2 PPIC
ϑAgtreat Exponent in Ag treatment cost share .3 .4 Derived from PPIC
φ Location of xdex in its interval 0 1 Bounds assumed
pˆd % Increase in annual failure probability in default 0 .15 Assumption
αδ Exponent in the survival function on χδ 1.5 4 Assumption
αPC Exponent in the survival function on χpc 1.5 4 Assumption
αin Exponent in the survival function on χin 1.5 4 Assumption
Pd Extra % post-disaster construction cost in the default 0.5 1 Assumption
Note: Additional uncertainty about state of the world incorporated in event trees (levee collapse etc.)
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Table A.3. Constants
Variable Value Source
ζ
collapse
Ur Share of the collapse cost paid by Ur .2 Assumption
ζ
collapse
Ag Share of the collapse cost paid by Ag .2 Assumption
ζ
repair
Tp Share of the repair cost paid by Tp 1 Assumption
ζconstructUr Share of the tunnels’ construction cost paid by Ur .45 Assumption
ζconstructAg Share of the construction cost paid by Ag .45 Assumption
ζconstructTp Share of the construction cost paid by Tp .1 Assumption
ζmntnUr Share of the costs of maintaining the Delta paid by Ur .1 Assumption
ζmntnAg Share of the costs of maintaining the Delta paid by Ag .1 Assumption
B0Tp Base benefit level for Tp ($ billion/yr) 100 2011-12 state budget
B0Ur Base benefit level for Ur ($ billion/yr) 5 Assumption
B0Ag Base benefit level for Ag ($ billion/yr) 2 Assumption
χ0 Pre-Wanger export level (maf) 6 PPIC
r Interest rate used in discounting .05 PPIC
Y rs Years over which the prob of failure applies 42 PPIC
χin0 Current level of inflow into the Delta (maf) 19.3 PPIC
ε0 Ag jobs w/no exports (millions ) .5 PPIC
ε1 Increase in Ag jobs w/ baseline exports instead of none (millions) .1 PPIC
qinflow Scaling parameter to incorporate Delta inflows in Dt utility
1
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Assumption
γTp Tp risk aversion 1 Assumption
ζˆtreatAg Share of treatment cost paid by Ag in base case .4 Derived from PPIC
xex Minimum value of total exports in the policy space (maf) 0 Choice
xex Maximum value of total exports in the policy space (maf) 7.5 Choice
ν Probability the ESA is enforced following a bad signal .75 Assumption
ηsmelt Information in smelt signal .75 Assumption
ηsalmon Information in salmon signal .75 Assumption
vEvboth Ev utility if both species survive 1 Immaterial assumption
vEvnone Ev utility if neither species survives 0 Immaterial assumption
ν0 Probability of ESA enforcement in the default 1 Assmption
χmax Maximum feasible export level (maf) 7.5 Downstream constraints per PPIC
pξ Probability of isolated conveyance structure following a disaster .5 Assumption
xdex Mean of the x
d
ex distribution 4 Assumption
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